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Abstract 
This paper takes a fresh and comprehensive look at how intellectual property rights 
(IPR) interact with formal standardisation activities. The interaction of these two 
institutions is integral to the working of the innovation infrastructure. Since the 
1980s, this has especially been true for industries involving strong network effects 
where an increasing level of tension and conflict has been noted. The importance of 
the relationship and the tendency for the interaction to lead to conflict is however 
not necessarily confined to information and communication technologies, which has 
been the focus until now. The paper works from the premise that the interaction 
between IPRs and standardisation involves a more general strain in the innovation 
system and that this strain potentially has implications that extend well beyond a 
single industry.  
 
In this light, the paper extends and broadens the existing analysis of this relationship 
in several fundamental ways. The paper’s major contribution to the mainly theoreti-
cal treatment in the current literature is a two-pronged empirical analysis involving 
a survey and a set of 20 case-studies across a set of industries. This exploratory em-
pirical approach provides an initial look at the potential for conflict in other indus-
tries where the balance between the importance of standardisation and the impor-
tance of patenting differ. The results from the complementary survey and case study 
work are then used to categorise the type of problems that emerge in a set of indus-
tries. In conclusion the paper discusses a set of policy approaches to the emerging 
problem in Europe. 
 2
1. Introduction 
IPR regimes and formal standardisation are key institutions in the changing frame 
of the innovation system. Although their roles are inherently complementary here, 
we know that the relationship between them has become increasingly tense as the 
use— and the conditions of use— of each has changed during the past two decades. 
The “co-evolution” of these and other factors has brought patenting in particular 
onto a collision course with formal standardisation activities. This has led to an in-
creasing number of conflicts and to new attempts to resolve them at different levels: 
at the institutional level (IPR policies), at the policy level (areas of competition, 
IPR, and standardisation policy), and in other multilateral contexts (patent pooling 
and other licensing schemes).  
 
This situation represents an emerging area of discordination at a key juncture of the 
innovation system. However, the treatment of this important issue has by and large 
been limited in scope and perspective. The literature has first and foremost de-
scribed and analysed the patent-based conflicts that have emerged in the area of 
information and communication technologies either in general theoretical (legal or 
economic) terms or in empirical treatments, mostly on a case to case basis. The is-
sues are however not necessarily limited to the ICT field, although this is obviously 
an area where the drive towards patenting and towards standardisation are particu-
larly strong. Nor is it necessarily confined to patents although this is the most obvi-
ous front for conflict where regards technological standardisation. Nor does it only 
involve the areas of standardisation, IPR, and competition policy, but may extend to 
research policy more generally. 
 
This paper works from the premise that the interaction between IPRs and standardi-
sation involves a more general strain in the innovation system, and that this strain 
potentially has implications that extend well beyond a single industry. This in turn 
suggests the need to broaden the frame of analysis and to direct increased policy 
attention to the complicated set of issues. In this context, the paper extends and 
broadens existing analysis of this relationship in several fundamental ways.1 The 
paper is structured in the following way. The paper first takes stock of the issues, 
extending the exploration of the economic questions to further investigate the im-
plications for public funding of research. The paper goes on to present the results of 
exploratory empirical work, which combines a survey and a set of 20 case studies 
based in different national and industrial contexts. This discussion considers lessons 
about the potential for conflict in different types of industries, while explicating the 
need to further improve the empirical work in the area. The paper finally discusses 
                                                 
1 The paper is based on information collected within a project funded by DG Research (EC 
Contract No G6MA-CT-2000-02001). See Blind et al. (2002), especially chapter D and E. 
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policy implications and a broad set of policy approaches while emphasising the 
need for further empirical analysis before drawing overly strong conclusions. 
 4
2. Issues in the interaction of IPRs and formal stan-
dardization  
The interaction between formal standardization—particularly in standards devel-
opment organizations—and IPRs— particularly the patent regime— involves fun-
damental issues in the economics of technological change. This section introduces 
the relationship in terms of the distinct roles they play in the “innovation infrastruc-
ture”, presenting the case that a co-evolutionary process is bringing what are ini-
tially complementary functions in the innovation process into increased confronta-
tion. 
 
Innovation is a complex evolutionary process involving the sustainable generation, 
distribution and utilization of new economically-relevant knowledge. This knowl-
edge continuously accumulates and is recombined in the economy2, contributing 
significantly to economic growth. The evolutionary economics literature3 points, in 
this setting, to the importance of two complementary processes: namely the genera-
tion of technological variety on the one hand and the selection process on the other. 
The interaction between technological diversification and a complementary selec-
tion process lays the basis for technological development. The process of diversifi-
cation drives evolution. In the case of technology, this involves a purposeful search 
by economic actors to adapt new technologies with performance attributes that are 
intended to distinguish them from rivals. “Fitness” involves success in this venture, 
not in terms of survival of the fittest or of the “best technology”, but in terms of 
success in navigating the selection environment.   
 
To a degree the process of selection can then be said to steer evolution. However 
selection and diversity do not happen in isolation from one another, but rather in 
close interaction. The ultimate selection mechanism in market economies is the 
market, where the fitness of an individual technology comes down to the choice of 
consumers. In an ideal situation, a technological design may ‘speciate’ to cater to 
differentiated niches of heterogenous users. 4 However, many other factors may 
affect choices in the selection environment—for example network externalities will 
shape preferences and affect the diffusion of new technologies. The case of launch-
ing large technological system, like a cellular telecoms system, provides a special 
challenge in successfully navigating the selection environment. Coordination in 
developing and selection is especially needed here to concurrently design and select 
                                                 
2  See David and Foray (1995).  
3 For a presentation of the issues and their genealogy see, Saviotti and Metcalfe(eds) (1991). Evolu-
tionary Theories of Economic and Technological Change. Harwood Academic publishers: Swit-
zerland.   
4 For an evolutionary explanation of such processes see for example Frenken & Nuvolari (2003).  
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the large set of design dimensions involved which furthermore interact in complex 
ways.   
 
This brief evolutionary explanation highlights the processes of search and of choice, 
both of which are unpredictable especially when one accepts that they interact.  This 
distinction between search and selection processes is apt for appreciating the roles 
of IPRs and SDOs, since each is a social institution in what can be described as the 
industrial infrastructure for innovation,5 that affects the search and the selection 
processes. In the following, Intellectual property rights regimes will be most closely 
associated with influencing the search process and fostering diversification of new 
technologies; institutional standardisation on the other hand will be most closely 
associated with the selection environment. The roles however overlap, apparently 
increasingly so. The point is the two central institutions play complementary roles 
in perpetuating such a balances   
2.1 Understanding the role of IPRs  
 
In this context, the term IPR means the technologically oriented rights used in the 
context of industrial innovation. This definition primarily includes patents and trade 
secrets, but in view of the importance of software, also certain applications of copy-
right protection. The rationale of patenting is the most relevant and most illustrative 
for standardisation. A patent on an invention is in effect a public contract that grants 
certain rights to the applicant for the use of a technical invention. The patent system 
caters to the assignee(s)’ basic desire to appropriate profits accruing to the inven-
tion, while catering to the public interest in having the details of the invention 
spread to others so that the system can build on new knowledge.6 In this view, the 
motives of the state involve (i) creating an incentive for actors in the economy to 
undertake inventive activities and (ii) to disseminate detailed information about 
inventive activities such that future generations can build upon them.7 The motive 
usually ascribed to the patent-applicant is on the other hand to use the protection 
                                                 
5 By ”industrial infrastructure for innovation”, Van de Ven (1993) understands: “institutional 
arrangements legitimate, regulate and standardise a new technology, public resource endow-
ments of basic scientific knowledge, financing mechanisms and a pool of competent labour, as 
well as proprietary R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution functions that are required 
to develop and commercialise an innovation.” (Van de Ven, 1993: 339). 
6 For a seminal discussion of patents as an appropriation/distribution regime, see Arrow (1962). 
Note that a basic premise of the incentive aspect is based on assuring the inventor a chance to 
recoup the cost of his R&D investment. For a recent empirical and theoretical contribution, see 
Cohen, Nelson & Walsh. Protecting their intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and why 
US manufacturing firms patent (or not). NBER Working PAPER No. 7552. Feb 2000. 
7 See Scotchmer (1991). 
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from competition to realize profits from the invention, either through developing it 
and commercialising it himself or through selling the rights to others who do the 
marketing of the innovation.  
 
Copyright has also become a large issue in standardisation due to its uneasy asso-
ciation with software.8 The question about how software should best be protected 
against imitation by copyright9 or by patent protection10 has recently arisen again in 
the European context. This question suggests one aspect of the changing environ-
ment that increasingly brings IPR into conflict with standards development organi-
sations (SDOs) in new ways. 
 
In general, IPRs have a role to play in organizing knowledge production, in promot-
ing new R&D, in promoting further utilization as well as coordinating use of new 
knowledge, while avoiding underutilization losses. 11 In terms of the economy as a 
whole, the way IPRs do this implies both costs and benefits. On the one hand, IPR-
protection brings with it social costs in the form of higher prices (monopoly pric-
ing): on the other, IPRs provide the economy with an incentive to innovate (based 
exactly on the prospects for the innovative firm for monopoly pricing). The monop-
oly profits provided by IPRs may have the added advantage for the economy as a 
whole if it is ploughed back into higher levels of production and innovation. David 
(1993) emphasizes the following dimensions of this role:  
 
a. The importance of full disclosure of information in patent applications. This al-
lows for dissemination, verification, and application by others engaged in intellec-
tual pursuits; 
b. The importance of “allocative efficiency”. The provision of efficient focusing of 
research effort entails, among other things, the avoidance of over-focusing effort on 
the same research; the avoidance of  “deadweight burden” of monopoly. This is the 
case where rights become too strong and bar close substitutes and raise royalties, 
while lowering the benefit to society in general and consumers in particular. It also 
involves the importance of achieving the coordination of R&D activities. This is 
topical in facilitating common standardization activities. 
c. The importance of avoiding “unproductive competition for monopoly profit” 
(Kitch, 1977: Beck, 1983) including, wastage of resources on premature invention, 
duplicative R&D, substitute inventions, and excessively rapid spending on research. 
The non-disclosure of patents in standardization activities represents a poignant 
                                                 
8 On copyrights on software, see Besen and Raskind (1991), pp. 11-14. 
9 Cf. Common Position concerning the draft of a copyright directive. Official Journal of the EU, 
no. C 344 of December 1, 2000. 
10 Cf for example Blind et al. (2003). 
11     For a short presentation of the role of IPRs in the innovation process, see e.g. Iversen (2002) on 
which this section draws. 
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example where patenting contributes to unproductive competition for monopoly 
profits.12
2.2 Understanding the role of Standardisation 
IPRs tend to be seen predominantly in terms of their contribution to the ‘incentive 
structure' and less for their role in distributing information about innovation 
throughout the economy. There are two characteristics we want to mark here:  
1) IPR are most often identified as a promoter of a diversity of technological ideas; 
and,  
2) IPRs lay the basis for proprietary technologies. 
 
In contrast, the role standardization, especially in standards development organiza-
tions (SDOs) plays in innovation13 can be associated with a selection process to 
reduce variety and with the creation of non-proprietary goods; ideally, they work in 
the collective interest of all actors.  
 
Standardisation is a process with a surprisingly large range of associations. There 
are different ways in which to classify standards and the standards process Stan-
dards can be differentiated as to what is standardised and as to how the standard is 
produced. As for the object dimension, there are product standards, control stan-
dards or process standards. As for the way standards are produced, there are again 
three categories: standards that are set through the market, on a de facto basis, stan-
dards that are set by government, through the regulatory process (mandatory stan-
dards) and standards that are negotiated through a voluntary consensus process.  
 
In general the economics literature tends to associate the role of formal standardiza-
tion with the idea of the ‘failure’ or inefficiency of markets. Schmidt & Werle 
(1998) indicate that the focus tends either to be on the reduction of transaction-
costs, especially related to information, or on associated with network externalities. 
Standards are associated with, among other things, reducing uncertainty by control-
ling variety;  enhancing competition by clearly defining what is required to serve a 
market (information); constituting markets by defining the relevant aspects of pro-
ducts (Tirole, 1988); facilitating scale-economies for suppliers, or influencing the 
distribution of cost and benefits of building and operating large complex technical 
systems. (Mansell, 1995: 217). Ideally, they work in the collective interest of all 
                                                 
12 See cases such as in Stambler v Diebold, Inc (1988), involving  the standards related to ATM 
cards, an early case of conflict in which a patent holder attempted to assert his patent for what 
manufacturers believed to be an open and available standard.  
13  See Iversen, 2000 
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actors. Then they provide a type of public good. (Cf. Berg, 1989, and Kindleberger, 
1983). 
 
Standards play a particularly important role as ‘selection mechanism’ especially in 
the case of network technologies, where the importance of narrowing the diversity 
of network technologies in order that the industry can take advantage of network 
externalities is highlighted.14 In short, network technologies are vulnerable to the 
generation of ‘too much diversity'. These technologies rely on connectivity, and 
their worth therefore rises in proportion to their user bases.  As a result, the un-
bounded proliferation of different, incompatible versions of an emerging radical 
technology may lead to a damaging Tower of Babel situation. The fight of individ-
ual alternatives to establish dominance in such a situation can be costly both for 
manufacturers, service providers and customers. In the end, a protracted fight for 
dominance might undermine the potential market for that emerging technology al-
together, and remove it from the technology race. Networks will simply not be cre-
ated in a sustainable way; the value of the component for the consumer will not be 
realised. Failing to amass a ‘critical mass' of users, the technology risks missing its 
fabled window of opportunity. There are many examples of this situation of the type 
of Betamax or more recently of the CT-2/ Telepoint system.  
2.3 Central aspects of the interrelationship 
In general, a complex set of factors induces and promotes the creation of diversity 
and another affects the complementary and intertwined selection process. The im-
portant thing is that there is a complex interrelationship that keeps the virtuous cir-
cle of the differentiation and the selection processes in swing. Intellectual property 
rights regimes and institutional standardisation are closely associated with these 
processes, although they are not tied to one or the other.  A stylized division of la-
bour indicates that IPRs, especially patents, are most closely related as incentive 
mechanisms to the continuous generation of technical variety while formal stan-
dards bodies, especially voluntary SDOs, are most closely related to selection from 
among the ripening variety of technological solutions. In reality, the roles are not 
this clear cut. The way IPRs and SDOs are used mixes their roles with regard to the 
creation of variety and the promotion of selection. On the one hand, the standardiza-
tion process has moved further and further in front of the market, such that stan-
dards activities contribute to creating new solutions not provided for by the market; 
the semantic web standards are one example. On the other, the increasing strategic 
use of IPR to create defensive bulwarks against competing technologies for exam-
ple can serve to mimic a selection mechanism; such strategies can limit the scope 
                                                 
14 See Katz & Shapiro, 1985, Farrell & Salloner, 1985, David, 1987. 
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for competing technologies to emerge and therefore reduce the gene pool from 
which new combinations of emerging technologies can develop and recombine. 
 
Indeed the interaction between variety and selection— and the roles of IPRs and 
SDOs in it— are much messier. The schematic division of labour does however 
point to an essential trade-off in the innovation process, it indicates the complemen-
tary roles of IPRs and SDOs, and it suggests the essential tension that underlies that 
relationship. Here it appears that the tension between these mechanisms stems from 
their opposition: opposition between the private interest of the inventor and the col-
lective interest of the industry and more fundamentally, opposition between a role 
in promoting technological variety as against that of facilitating a certain uniform-
ity. 
 
In this setting, maintaining balance is important. Too much variety may be bad 
since, “variety conveys efficiencies in specialization and customization that are off-
set by the failure to achieve network externalities and other economies of scale” 
(Steinmueller, 1995). Likewise, the opposite may also be the case since, "in reduc-
ing diversity, standardization curtails the potentialities for the formation of new 
combinations and the regeneration of variety from which further selection will be 
possible" (David, 1995). Therefore, in the ongoing interaction between the genera-
tion of technological variety and its selection, "effective long-term adaptation re-
quires that these two processes be kept in balance" (Carlson & Stankiewicz, 1991).  
 
One implicit side of incorporating the institutional framework systemically with the 
innovation process is that the different components - technologies, institutions, etc - 
will tend to ‘co-evolve’ (Nelson, 1994). That is, the rapid change of technologies 
will also be reflected through a two-way relationship with the institutional frame-
work. Institutions will be forced to change and their changing will also reflect the 
way technology evolves. The reason that this phenomenon of co-evolution is impor-
tant here is that both IPR regimes and SDOs are undergoing changes. The OECD 
report on ICT standardisation in the new global context discusses some of the rele-
vant changes standardisation is facing, including the IPR concern. It appears that it 
is this changing environment that is translating the inherent tension between these 
two institutions into conflict (Iversen, 2000). 
2.4. Central aspects of the emerging conflict 
Since the mid-1990s, it has been observed (e.g. Iversen, 1996) that a set of forces 
has served to amplify the tension and has begun to threaten the balance. The pros-
pect that the role of IPRs should come into conflict with the complementary role of 
formal standardization suggests that the way these institutions are each evolving is 
translating the inherent tension into conflict. (Iversen, 2000) 
 10
 
The potential for conflict between intellectual property rights and standardization 
arises when the implementation of a standard, by its essence, necessitates the appli-
cation of proprietary technology. The case of ‘essential intellectual property 
rights’15 is implicit to the tension between the two institutions. The risk that may 
emerge during the standardization process is that the codification of the specifica-
tions will infringe the proprietary rights described in the IPRs of one or more such 
agents. The IPR will be considered ‘essential’ if the standard, by its depth and de-
tail, necessitate the use of the proprietary technical solutions describe in it. Should it 
do so, the collective interest in the standard confronts the private interests of the 
IPR holder.16
 
A court is ultimately needed to establish whether or not the IPR (patent or software-
copyright for example) is really ‘essential’. At the same time, a court case would 
require considerable time and resources17, and could jeopardize the collective stan-
dardization enterprise. So the difference between an IPR that is in reality essential 
and one that is potentially essential is not that great after all: both cases threaten to 
tie up the standardization process. Essential intellectual property rights in this sense 
should be further differentiated from ‘Blocking IPRs’ which definitively block the 
process.  
 
However, the interaction between business and standards increasingly raises the 
situation of the essential and blocking IPR. A blocking IPR can be a result of two 
main situations for companies. In the first general set, the IPR holder refuses to li-
cense or refuses to on a basis that is considered fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory. The threat to withhold IPRs in this situation may be used as a bar-
gaining chip. A flat refusal would be regarded with extreme suspicion. The exis-
tence of essential intellectual property rights among individual rights-holders out-
side the standardization work is much less predictable. Absent the necessary search 
processes, such rights may appear at any time during the life of the standard. The 
willingness of the rights-holder to license at agreeable terms is likewise not a by-
gone conclusion, especially if added to already agreed upon royalty-schemes. 
 
The second set of cases involves a plurality of rights-holders. The relevance of this 
case—that more than one right held by more than one rights-holder—is itself testi-
mony to the fact that intellectual property rights and the work of standards devel-
opment organizations have become much more inter-tangled. A variety of rights-
holders complicates the licensing process which is supposed to be fair both for the 
                                                 
15 For a description of the possible outcomes, see Lea & Shurmer, 1995. See Iversen, 1999 for the 
way ETSI IPR Policy addressed such outcomes. 
16 See Miselbach & Nicholson (1994) for a description of essential IPRs. 
17 Witness the current Rambus case. Rambus v. Infineon and FTC v. Rambus, Inc., FTC (No. 9302). 
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licensee and licensor. What happens when the cumulative royalty costs, while fair to 
the individual rights-holder, become too high for potential licensee? The short an-
swer is that the standard would die. This raises the question of different ways to 
address cases of conflict, which are becoming more and more common. Finding 
solutions to new challenges in the interaction however does not happen by itself. 
2.5 Summing up 
IPRs involve a more proprietary and standards more of a public domain aspect. 
Consequently, this difference entails a certain tension in their relationship, which 
may cause a broad scope for conflict and therefore a need for policy attention. Be-
sides this, there has been a rising propensity to use patents, together with a growing 
reliance on standards activities. Since standardisation has moved more towards the 
coordination of technologies, it has also taken on a more active role in knowledge-
creation process. On the other hand, the pooling of IPR has become an issue rele-
vant for standardisation. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the increasing inten-
sity of patenting in particular areas. The effect on how IPR and standards are being 
used, combined with some other changing framework conditions (like the interna-
tionalisation of markets, the convergence of technologies, and the increasing pace 
of technological change) has led to a growing tendency to conflict. Consequently, 
the dynamic balancing of private and public knowledge becomes a constant consid-
eration both for SDOs and for government agencies. 
 
Three constellations illustrate how IPR and standards interrelate: 
 
a) the two are designed to complement each other, which promotes a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of creation and diffusion of new knowledge 
b) in a worst case, IPR, especially patents, can be exercised to block standards, 
with considerable negative welfare impacts 
c) however, in a growing number of cases there is a need to ensure more efficient 
licensing mechanisms, for example through equitable patent-pool schemes, 
which do not endanger the IPR regime, but allow their controlled diffusion into 
standardisation processes.  
 
 12
4. Presentation of new empirical research 
This section addresses the substantial lack of systematic empirical study in the lit-
erature. It considers the scope for conflict in a variety of industries where the bal-
ance between the importance of standardisation and the importance of patenting 
differ. The empirically based approach combining a survey and a set of 20 case 
studies presents two new sources of (exploratory) empirical evidence.18 The results 
from the complementary survey and case study work are then used to categorise the 
type of problems that emerge in a set of industries.  
4.1 The explorative survey among a set of industries in differ-
ent countries 
An empirical survey was conducted to assess the problems sketched above in a quan-
titative manner. More than 150 experts from European manufacturing companies, 
including R&D managers, IPR managers and standardisation experts, were ap-
proached to answer questions about their IPR management, their involvement in 
standardisation processes, and their experiences concerning the interaction between 
standardisation and IPR in general. 
 
Among the strategies to protect their innovations, secrecy and related measures such 
as customer relations management, lead-time advantages and complex product de-
sign are most important. As already confirmed by other surveys, patenting is only of 
medium importance in comparison to other protection tools. The importance of pat-
enting as a protection tool rises with the firm size, but so does the importance of 
secrecy. This is in particular true for patenting and R&D-intensive companies. The 
protection of own technology from imitation has the highest importance as a motive 
to patent. This corresponds with the classical (defensive) use of patents, but also 
with the economic reasoning behind patenting. Aggressive forms of patenting are a 
more important issue with big companies. The business-related aspects of patenting 
such as the generation of licensing income and the acquisition of venture capital are 
of relatively low importance.  
 
More than 50 % of the responding companies have been involved actively in stan-
dardisation in the last three years. The survey results confirm also the increasing 
importance of European and international standardisation. The most important rea-
son to participate in standardisation is to exert influence and to prevent certain 
                                                 
18 The empirical evidence draws on Blind et al. (2002) and is extended by Blind and Thumm 
(2004). 
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specifications in standards. Companies that are involved in standardisation proce-
dures file much fewer patent applications than those firms that are not involved in 
standardisation. This might be an indicator that the use of IPR, reflecting the suc-
cess of own R&D activities, and participation in standardisation are to a certain de-
gree alternative innovation strategies. 
 
The motives for participation in standardisation that assume a close relationship to 
R&D are rather weak. Both the improvement of the dissemination of own IPR and 
the reduction of R&D costs reach values below average. Therefore, the question has 
to be answered, what prevents companies from using the standardisation system and 
from transferring their research results into formal standardisation. The most impor-
tant barriers reported are problems in connection with the standardisation process. 
Firstly, standardisation is too slow, secondly too costly, especially for small compa-
nies, and thirdly too inflexible, particularly for large companies. Furthermore, the 
co-ordination between research and standardisation organisations and the awareness 
by researchers are insufficient and have to be improved.  
 
In order to improve the transfer of research results into formal standardisation proc-
esses, it is vital to raise the awareness of the benefits of standards. Financial incen-
tives are especially suggested by small and medium-sized companies, which have 
emphasised the high costs as a major barrier to transferring their R&D results into 
the standardisation processes. 
 
Besides the transfer problem, there are obviously numerous conflicts with IPR in 
standardisation processes. Most problems arise with patents. Over 30 % of the com-
panies indicate that they had problems with own patents and over 40 % of them had 
problems with the patents of others within the standardisation process. Concerning 
the kind of problems, over 40 % of the large companies indicate that their licensing 
conditions have not been accepted. Over 35 % of the patent-intensive companies 
have experienced infringements of their IPR. The results also indicate that there is a 
real problem with IPR in standardisation, because over 50 % of the companies indi-
cate that they have never found a solution to their conflicts. To purchase licenses 
and circumvent protected technologies are the strategies most often used to over-
come this problem.  
 
In order to overcome conflicts with IPR involved in formal standardisation proc-
esses, some measures have been proposed. However, both mandatory licensing, 
reduced terms of patents, and a shift of responsibility for screening of IPR involve-
ment in standards to the IPR-holders are not assessed as being adequate solutions.  
 14
4.2 The set of case studies 
In order to complement the sometimes puzzling quantitative results of the survey by 
qualitative information, case studies were performed to elucidate the relationship be-
tween IPR and standardisation in more depth. 
 
With respect to the objective of the paper, it is of particular interest to see under 
which conditions and why conflicts between IPR and standardisation emerge. The 
analysis performed on the survey gives some answers. We do not present details of 
the cases, but try to report insights about clusters of several cases. 
 
A high potential of conflict between IPR and standardisation arose in particular in 
six cases of the presented case studies. All these technologies are highly relevant for 
IPR activities and most of these case studies showed involvement in formal stan-
dardisation procedures. These technologies are not at an early stage of development, 
but tend to be more mature technologies. Naturally the conflict potential rises with 
the complexity of the technologies, thus conflicts seem to be more likely with sys-
temic technologies than with non-systemic ones. Conflict potential for the men-
tioned cases also accompanied a high level of competition, with many participants 
in the market and with heterogeneous actors involved. 
 
In the interest of a more systematic approach in the comparative analysis of the case 
studies, a list of categories was developed in order to differentiate the cases and to 
identify relationship patterns between IPR and standards primarily of a qualitative 
order. 
 
The fundamental distinction with respect to standardisation processes and standards 
is between formal and de facto standardisation. Formal standardisation is under-
stood to take place via SDOs, where formal standards, pre-standards or publicly 
available specifications (PAS) are produced. De facto standardisation is on the other 
hand driven by closed consortia of companies or even single companies which de-
velop under non-transparent circumstances mostly, but not always, proprietary de 
facto standards.  
 
From the technological perspective, process standards, including test methods or 
architectures, and product standards can be differentiated. Furthermore, the technol-
ogy considered can be at an early stage or can already have progressed to a mature 
phase. This distinction is closely connected with the R&D intensity, since the in-
vestment in R&D declines the more mature a technology is. Finally, technologies 
can be systemic, like information and communication technologies, or non-systemic 
and stand-alone, like chemistry. However, there is a clear tendency among all tech-
nologies to become more systemic, because technologies become more intertwined 
with an increasing importance of interdisciplinarity and within a technology the 
specialisation and therefore the division of labour increase. The dimension of (net-
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work) externalities is closely related to the issue of systems technologies. The more 
intense network externalities are, the more likely it is that standards will be devel-
oped.  
 
Besides the technology-intrinsic dimensions relevant for standardisation, market 
structure may also have an influence on standardisation and IPR. However, in the 
long run, both IPR and standards have an impact on the development of markets. 
Therefore, the degree of competition in a market may foster or hinder standardisa-
tion and the use of IPR. 
 
In addition to the technological and economic framework conditions, the standardi-
sation process itself differs – besides the general distinction into formal and de facto 
standardisation – according to several dimensions. First of all, the number of par-
ticipants actively involved can vary. Second, the composition of the participants can 
vary between a very homogeneous group consisting of just representatives of large 
companies and a heterogeneous group, involving not only experts from companies, 
but also from research institutes and representatives of diverse groups interested in 
protecting the interests of labour union, of the environment or the consumers. 
Thirdly, participants may all be of the same nationality, may come from European 
countries or may be globally located – another dimension of heterogeneity. 
 
The standardisation process focuses on the harmonisation of one technical specifi-
cation. However, different public policy concerns are also recognised or are even 
the main cause for a standardisation process. The generation of standards may be a 
major element of an industrial policy strategy or a main instrument in order to sup-
port the protection of the health and safety of consumers or workers. Even ethical 
dimensions may play a significant role. 
 
Finally, technologies and sectors differ in respect to the usage of IPR and to the 
degree standards are being developed, caused by both the characteristics of the 
technologies and the structure of the industries, like the intensity of competition. 
 
These various framework conditions have impacts both on the efficiency of the 
standardisation processes and their output, measured by standard documents pub-
lished per year. As we have seen various dimensions of differences between the 
participants, it is more likely that conflicts in standardisation processes arise the 
higher the heterogeneity and the more proprietary IPR is involved. On the other 
hand, the more homogeneous the actors and their preferences, the more co-
operation is likely to occur. However, heterogeneous participants may have com-
plementary goals, which do not lead to conflicts but to common efforts to achieve a 
common standard. Since no one-dimensional or unequivocal causalities exist be-
tween the characteristics of the cases and possible conflicts or solutions appearing 
during the standardisation process, in the following sections exemplary incidents 
are presented. 
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The following Table 4.2.1 systematises the cases according to a set of categories. 
The matrix makes the wide range of constellations and combinations clear. There 
are almost no cases, which are identical respective to the categories, although simi-
larities exist.19
                                                 
19 Rare abbreviations: PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction; EDM: Essential Drug and Medicines 
Policy; FTTO: Farmaco Therapeutisch Transmuraal Overleg; BMEcat: Catalogue of the BME 
Bundesverband Materialwirtschaft, Einkauf und Logistik e.V.; TETRA: Terrestrial Trunked Ra-
dio; CAN: controller-area network. 
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Table 4.2-1: Classification of Cases (NA = not assessable) 
Case Formal/ De
facto 
 Product/ 
Process 
Early/ 
Mature 
High
/ 
Low 
R&
D 
Sys-
temic/ 
Non- 
systemic 
High/ Low 
external-
ities 
High/ Low 
competi-
tion  
Many
/ Few 
parti-
ci-
pants 
Heterogene-
ous/ Homo-
geneous 
actors 
Global/ 
Euro-
pean 
partici-
pation 
Yes/ 
No 
public 
policy 
con-
cerns 
High/ 
Low IPR 
involve-
ment 
Kind of IPR Coopera-
tion/ Con-
flict  
High/ Low 
level of 
standardisa-
tion 
Ther. 
Antibody 
De facto Product Early High Non 
syst.
Low     High Few Homo Yes
(health)
High    Patents Low
Genetic 
Testing 
Formal   Prod-
uct/Proces
Early High Non
syst.
High   High Many Hetero Europ. Yes 
(ethics)
High    
    
Patents Conflict Low
PCR Formal Process Early High Non
syst.
High        
   
High Few Homo Yes (re- High
esearch
Patents Low
Opto-
electro. 
Formal Process Mature High Non
syst.
Low     Medium Few Hetero Global No Medium Patents Coop. Medium
Paral. Opt. 
Interface. 
 
Formal          
   
Product Early High Sys-
temic
High High Few Hetero Global No Medium Patents Coop. Medium
EDM Formal Process Mature Low Non
syst.
Low    High Many Hetero Global Yes
(health)
Medium    
    
(indirect)
Patents
Coop. Low
FTTO Formal Process Mature Low Non
syst.
Low    High Many Hetero Global Yes
(health)
Medium    
  
(indirect)
Patents
Coop. Low
VCR De facto Product Mature High Sys-
t i
High       
  
Low Few Homo Global No High Patents Conflict High
CD De facto Product Mature High Sys-
t i
High       
   
Low Few Homo Global No High Patents/ TM Coop. High
DVD De facto Product Me-
di
High Sys-
t i
High       
   
Low Many Hetero Global No High Patents/TM  Coop. High
MP3 Formal Process Me-
di
High Sys-
t i
High      
      
Low Many Hetero Global Yes Medium Patents /TM Coop. Medium
GSM Formal Process Mature High Sys-
temic
High High Many Hetero Global/
Eu
 
ro-
Yes  
          
High Patents Conflict High 
BMEcat De facto Product
/Process 
Me-
dium 
Low Sys-
temic
High Medium Few Hetero National
-> 
 No Medium TM Coop High (e.g. 
EDIFACT)
Fieldbus         
           
         
           
           
            
    
Formal Process Mature High Sys-
temic
High High Many Hetero National
Global 
  No High TM/ Patents Conflict High 
TETRA Formal Process Me-
dium 
High Sys-
temic 
High High Many Hetero Global/
Euro-
pean 
 Yes Medium Patents,
Copyright 
Conflict High
CAN Formal Process Mature NA. Sys-
temic 
 
High Medium Few Homogeneous Global Yes Medium Patents Coop. High
Aluminium 
alloy body 
Informal Product Me-
dium 
High Non
syst. 
High High Many Hetero Europ. Yes
(safety) 
 
Low None Coop. Low
Creep-
Plastic 
Formal Process Me-
dium 
High Non
syst. 
High High Many Hetero Global Yes
(safety) 
 
Low None Coop. Medium
Interna-
tional 
Stand. 
Formal NA NA NA NA NA NA Many Hetero Global Yes NA NA NA
ETSI Formal NA NA NA Sys-
temic 
NA NA Many Hetero Global/  Yes NA All IPR Conflict NA 
 1
4.3 Conflict Potentials 
The results of the questionnaire-based survey above revealed that 40% of the re-
spondents had problems with IPR of others in standardisation processes. This con-
flicting relationship between IPR and standardisation is also reflected in some of the 
cases analysed.  
  
The particular sensitivity of biotechnology with respect to intellectual property right 
protection requires careful treatment by any future regulation. The high level of IPR 
engagement on the one side and the need for standardisation on the other hand pro-
vides a dangerous future minefield. The legal situation of patentability for gene se-
quences is not conclusively resolved. The official position is that gene sequences 
are in principle patentable once they are isolated, identified and made practically 
available, together with a process to develop and apply them to a practical use. Ge-
netic testing services used in clinical diagnosis of genetic disease are neither regu-
lated nor standardised in Europe. There are some indications that the excessive use 
of IPR in the field of genetics limits the accessibility of competitively priced genetic 
testing services and hinders test-specific development of national programmes for 
quality assurance. Since it is a relatively new field of technology, the possibilities 
for abuse of a dominant market position are large. Monoclonal antibody generation 
and genetic testing methods are illustrative examples of the dynamism and the com-
plexity of biotechnological production methods. 
4.4 Solution Potentials 
Besides the different lines of conflicts, which have been identified in the question-
naire-based survey and in the case studies, solutions to these conflicts are also pre-
sented which may serve as examples for standardisation processes of other tech-
nologies. 
 
In general, four quadrants can be distinguished. Technologies which are still at a 
very early stage of development— like nanotechnology— are both still free of IPR, 
like patents, and dominated by scientific publications. Due to the emphasis on basic 
research, applications remain largely in the future, therefore there is no need for 
standards at the moment. The second cluster of pharmaceutics and biotechnology is 
characterised by a high density of IPR and a more mature stage in the life cycle of 
the technology. Only very few sectors have little IPR, like many service related and 
software based areas. Consequently, little or no problems with standardisation arise. 
In some cases, like in optical electronical metrology, we observe a simultaneous 
existence of IPR and standardisation activities on a medium level. In a pre-
competitive field of technology, aeronautics, both IPR and standards in form of 
guidelines coexist beside each other without causing conflicts, since the group of 
involved actors is small and rather homogeneous. Finally, we have the large and 
growing field of ICT. The involved companies try to build up strong IPR portfolios. 
On the other hand, the need to generate positive network externalities requires the 
 development of common, world-wide accepted standards. Consequently, the con-
flict potential is most intense. However, the pressure to find a common agreement is 
also very high, since only in exceptional cases are single companies able to enforce 
a proprietary de facto standard.   
 
Although we have developed numerous categories to classify the cases, a simple 
obvious clustering of the cases is not possible. Therefore, we have reduced the di-
mension down to two, which reflect the core of our paper. In Figure 4.4-1, we have 
located selected cases according to the involvement of standards and IPR. In addi-
tion, four relevant policy areas are depicted. In the following final chapter, recom-
mendations are derived which aim to solve possible conflicts between IPR and 
standardisation or to optimise their interface. 
 
Figure 4.4-1: Categorisation of Cases by their Standards- and IPR-Intensity 
and Relevance of Different Policy Approaches 
? 
? 
Increasing 
Standards-
Intensity 
Nanotech-
nology 
BMECat Aeronautics 
nology 
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ICT 
formal:  de facto: 
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- TETRA - CD 
- ETSI  - DVD 
EDM 
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Opt. 
elect. 
metr. 
Stan-
dardi-
sation- 
Policy 
R&D- 
Policy 
IPR- 
Policy 
CAN 
Competition-
Policy 
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applications will be realised in the future, therefore there is no need for standards at 
the moment. The second cluster of pharmaceutics and biotechnology is character-
ised by a high density of IPR and a more mature stage in the life cycle of the tech-
nology. Only very few sectors have little IPR, like many service related and soft-
ware based areas. Consequently, little or no problems with standardisation arise. In 
some cases, like in optical electronical metrology, we observe a simultaneous exis-
tence of IPR and standardisation activities on a medium level. In a pre-competitive 
field of technology, aeronautics, both IPR and standards in form of guidelines coex-
ist beside each other without causing conflicts, since the group of involved actors is 
small and rather homogeneous. Finally, we have the large and growing field of ICT. 
The involved companies try to build up strong IPR portfolios. On the other hand, 
the need to generate positive network externalities requires the development of 
common, world-wide accepted standards. Consequently, the conflict potential is 
most intense. However, the pressure to find a common agreement is also very high, 
since only in exceptional cases are single companies able to enforce a proprietary de 
facto standard. 
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5. Discussion of the policy implications and policy ap-
proaches  
Overall, the literature survey, the results of the questionnaire-based survey and the 
analysis of the case studies have shown the variety of interrelationships between 
IPR and standardisation. The review of the literature confirms that the relationship 
is a relatively new phenomenon, especially virulent in network industries, like tele-
communications. The answers of the survey support the relevance of the issue, since 
conflicts of IPR in standardisation processes are much more likely than the existing 
literature, especially focused on specific cases, suggests. Furthermore, the IPR issue 
is indeed predominantly one involving patents, but both the survey and the case 
studies show that copyright and other rights may also be involved. Finally, the em-
pirical evidence makes clear that many of the numerous conflicts between IPR and 
standardisation are not adequately resolved. 
 
For the policy dimension it is also notable, that the interface can either be located 
closer to the research and development area or already in the marketing phase of 
products. Consequently, the policy approaches have to cover both research and de-
velopment, the IPR regime, the standardisation regime and competitive issues.  
 
Sometimes, a recommendation concerning one policy area may contradict a pro-
posal made from another policy perspective. For example, stronger IPR regimes 
may provide companies with additional incentives to perform more R&D. On the 
other hand, this change may increase the likelihood of IPR-related problems in 
standardisation processes. A final decision can only be made by regarding the spe-
cific framework conditions of the respective technology or market. Therefore, a 
comprehensive shaping of the interrelationship between IPR and standardisation has 
to take into account all the policy dimensions. However, since different institutions, 
like R&D funding organisations, patent offices, standardisation bodies, and institu-
tions regulating competition are addressed by the policy recommendations, there are 
many difficulties in finding a consensus among their interests and developing co-
ordinated actions. 
5.1 Research Policy Recommendations 
Although research policies are not directly linked to standardisation, the origin of 
new standardisation projects can often be found in publicly funded research pro-
jects. Furthermore, the direction of research activities can be more easily influenced 
by the design of public policy than by standardisation activities, which are mostly 
driven by private interests. The evidence from the results of the survey conducted 
and some experiences from the case studies allow us to derive the following rec-
ommendations concerning future research policies: 
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• Increase awareness among researchers about the relevance and the implications 
of standards and standardisation processes by training or exchange of personnel.  
• Integrate clear provision for support that may be needed in order to transfer pro-
ject results into standards in public RTD programmes.  
• Make sure that all research to develop test and measurement methods establish 
the scope for the development of a new standard at the very beginning.  
• Identify promoters who are part of research teams as well as a members of rele-
vant standardisation committees, since they may be able to support the transfer 
of research results into standards more effectively and efficiently. 
• Improve the information flows between the public research institutes and the 
standardisation bodies, by recognising their scientific and technological contri-
bution to standardisation processes in scientific evaluations of these institutions. 
• Publish successful case studies of the co-existence of IPR and standards 
amongst the research community. 
5.2 IPR Policy Recommendations 
The characteristics of the IPR regime have major impacts on the effectiveness and 
the efficiency of standardisation processes. Although not only patents have been 
addressed in the survey and the case studies, they clearly dominate the relationship 
between IPR and standardisation. Therefore, the following recommendations are 
focused on changes in the patenting regime or practice:  
 
• Assure a high level of quality of issued patents, thus reducing the risk of con-
flicts arising from weak patents.  
• Promote a world-wide harmonisation of national IPR regimes in order to de-
crease the likelihood of conflicts caused by cross-border application of technical 
standards. 
• Improve the transparency and accessibility of IPR material in order to make the 
monitoring activities in the IPR minefield easier. 
• Allow for compulsory licensing provisions as last resort in the court system.  
• The IPR Helpdesk, funded by the EU, should also provide services concerning 
the role of IPR in standards. 
5.3 Standardisation Policy Recommendations 
The following recommendations are addressed to SDOs, which may modify their 
guidelines according to the suggestions made. However, the existing ISO/IEC direc-
tives related to patents, which are implemented by most SDOs, proved to be effec-
tive and efficient in most circumstances. Nevertheless, the proposals are mostly 
directed to general strategic standardisation policies, including licensing and disclo-
sure rules.  
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• Encourage SDOs to identify promising new technologies in their very early 
stages and to start new standardisation processes instead of waiting for them to 
mature, since in the very early pre-competitive stage of technology life cycles 
there is some pressure on the actors to converge their interests.  
• Increase the awareness among participants of standardisation processes of pos-
sible inputs from science.  
• Prefer standards which do not specify the design of components, but their per-
formance, in order to avoid conflicts with patents protecting these components. 
• Limit the duration and the scope of an entire system as well as the level of detail 
of a standardisation process, in order to restrict the probability for IPR conflicts. 
• Change the framework conditions of standardisation in such a way that the in-
centives of innovative R&D-intensive companies to join standardisation proc-
esses become more attractive in general (e. g. allow attractive licensing 
schemes, see below).  
• Standardisation processes should become faster, cheaper and more flexible. 
5.4 Disclosure Rules 
Disclosure rules enable the SDOs to obtain information about whether technologies 
under consideration for inclusion in the standard are proprietary and subject to li-
censing. They thereby reduce the potential for a technology to be included in a 
standard without the knowledge that a technology owner, with intellectual property 
that impinges on the standard, may try to extract royalties for the use of his technol-
ogy. 
 
• Because of differences across industries in the reward afforded by patent protec-
tion and in the needs for compatibility and standardisation, no disclosure rule 
would be optimal for all situations. 
• Increase the transparency of IPR relevant for standards by building up publicly 
available databases with IPR that are potentially ‘essential’ for their standards. 
5.5 Licensing Policy 
Having learned through disclosure which elements of the standardised technology 
may be proprietary and subject to royalties, the SDOs are still left with the problem 
of drafting guidelines for setting licensing fees the technology-owner should charge 
after the standard is determined. The typical policy mandating that a royalty be 
"fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" gives little guidance for royalty determi-
nation because "reasonable" can mean different things to a technology-owner and a 
technology-buyer. 
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• Make databases available which contain details of exemplary licensing cases, 
which provide guidelines for the negotiations between the IPR-holders and po-
tential licensees. 
• Take into account the IPR-holders´ pre-selection negotiation and conclusion of 
licenses with individual licensees in the standard selection process. 
• Encourage SDOs to set up some means of dispute resolution within the organi-
sation to help resolve royalty disagreements, since this will be quicker and 
cheaper than resorting to the courts. 
5.6 Patent Pools 
Since usually not only a single patent has to be considered for integration into a 
standard, patent pools may represent an organisational model to save transaction 
cost regarding both disclosure and licensing of IPR, compared to multilateral nego-
tiations. They are also able to resolve conflicts both among IPR-holders themselves 
and between IPR-holders and standards users. Nevertheless, to establish and run 
patent pools efficiently, and to promote their general welfare advantages, some con-
flict potentials and potential disadvantages, like their misuse as a price-fixing 
mechanism, have to be taken into account and the following recommendations 
should be considered.  
• Pool patents early, in order to avoid constellations with two or more pools 
driven by different interests. 
• Use public non-profit research institutions as key gravitational force for creating 
patent pools, since they can more easily balance the often controversial interest 
of the companies.  
• Involve companies in patent pools which are successful in distributing new 
products and technologies, since this may guarantee the successful acceptance 
of a new standard in the market. 
5.7 Competition Policy Recommendations 
Both the outcome of the IPR regime, like granting a temporary monopoly via pat-
ents, and the results of standardisation processes, like the specifications of a stan-
dard causing heterogeneous implementation costs at the user side, may have nega-
tive impacts on competition. However, standardisation may also foster competition 
by levelling the playing field.  
 
In general, competition policy makers have to develop a better understanding of the 
scope of conflict between IPR and standardisation and its impact on competition 
policy issues. In general, a more intensive dialogue between all parties involved can 
be a first step to this better understanding.  
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Besides this general suggestion, the following proposals focus less on different con-
sequences of the IPR regime for standardisation and competition, but more on the 
consequences of the interaction of IPR and standards on competition.  
 
• If IPR-protected technologies are integrated in a standard, be very careful about 
possible negative impacts on competition, since this constellation may increase 
the monopoly power of the IPR-holder. A remedy could be the prescription of 
compulsory licenses, although this instrument should be used very restrictively, 
because of its negative incentive signal to innovative companies interested in 
standardisation. 
• In the case that standards become mandatory via reference in other regulations, 
solutions have to be found to deal with IPR-holders who refuse to give licenses 
away for no or very small fees.  
• Consider also standardisation as an instrument to solve antitrust problems, since 
it allows that all interested parties influence both the specifications of a standard 
and implement it, leading to a common level in the playing field of competition. 
Therefore, standardisation may also substitute the regulation of competition by 
governmental institutions. 
• Standards are able to devalue the brand loyalty, which is built up during the 
terms of patents, after the patent protection comes to an end, since standards 
may speed up the substitution process after the termination of the patent protec-
tion period. 
• Increase the pro-competitive aspects of patent pools by the involvement of 
competition policy authorities in laying out allowable licensing arrangements of 
patent pools. Furthermore, a patent pool notification scheme increases the trans-
parency for these institutions and alleviates and improves their decision-making 
process.  
5.8 Summary 
Since the rationales and objectives of the four policy areas differ in general, there 
are tensions between the recommendations proposed. In addition, the recommenda-
tions address different institutions. Consequently, there is a need for coordinated 
action in order to improve the relationship between standardisation and IPR, also 
taking research and competition policy aspects into account. A first step towards a 
comprehensive action is to convoke the responsible authorities and encourage an 
intensive exchange of ideas. Based on a better understanding, further steps towards 
an integrated policy approach can be undertaken. 
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